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I

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 confers jurisdiction over this appeal as a case
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred by finding that Bob Miles ("Miles"), the
employee of Byer Excavating, Inc. ("Byer") was acting outside the course and scope of his
employment for Byer Excavating at the time of the accident which is the subject of this
action.
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred by finding that Miles was not acting under
apparent authority of Byer at the time of the accident.
Standard of Review for both issues: The issue identified above should be reviewed
for correctness.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party...
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court reviews the
trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and grants them no deference.
Thus, the appellate court considers only whether the trial court correctly applies
the law and correctly concludes that no disputed issues of material fact existed.
Francisconiv. Union Pacific

Railroad,36?3d999,l00\A002(\]tahCt.App.2001).
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RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j):
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:..
(J) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
UtahR. Civ. P. 56(c):
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case
The Plaintiff/Appellant, EJ. Sutton ("Sutton") filed this lawsuit against Byer and

others alleging damages resulting from the injuries he sustained when the rebar fell on him.
(SeeR. 1-8.)
B.

Course of proceedings
Byer has defended this matter claiming that its employee, Bob Miles, was acting

outside the course and scope of his employment. (See R. 37 and 560-629.) The parties have
conducted extensive discovery, but no trial was set.
C.

Disposition at trial court
Sutton settled his claims against all parties except Byer. (See R. 957-958.) The trial
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

court entered an order granting Byer's motion for summary judgment on September 27,2010,
and dismissed all claims against Byer. (See R. .963-965.)
RELEVANT FACTS
On or about August 1, 2007, Sutton was employed as a framing superintendent for
R.W. Construction, a subcontractor working on the construction of a home located at 174
White Pine Canyon Road in Park City, Utah (hereinafter "Lot 174"). (See R. 641.) The
general contractor at Lot 174 was M.H. Allred Construction. (See id.) Appellee Byer
Excavating, Inc. ("Byer"), was a subcontractor hired by M.H. Allred Construction to
excavate Lot 174. (See R. 642.) Bob Miles (Miles") was a trackhoe operator for Byer. (See
R. 669-670.)
A load of rebar was being delivered to Lowell Construction Company ("Lowell") to
an adjacent lot 173 on White Pine Canyon Road in Park City, Utah (hereinafter "Lot 173").
(See R. 3 and 646.) Lowell did not have equipment available to offload the rebar and place
the rebar near its building project. (See R. 3.)
Lowell asked Sutton if Byer's excavator could help offload the rebar. (See R. 646.)
Sutton asked Miles, Byer's trackhoe operator, to help offload the rebar. (See R. 669-670.)
Miles agreed to operate the trackhoe to move the rebar. (See R. 646, 668, and 670.) Miles
testified that he felt he had the authority to make the decision to do the work and did not need
to contact any of his supervisors to get permission. (See R. 670-671.) Miles moved the load
even though he had limited visibility and could not observe the load and the area where the
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load was being moved. (See R. 4 and 649.) Additionally, Miles failed to have a spotter
assisting with the movement of the rebar. (See R. 3 and 649.) Miles operated the trackhoe
and moved the rebar without leaving Lot 174. (See R. 698-699.)
With respect to the request to assist in moving the rebar, Miles testified in his
deposition as follows:
...Did you know E.J. Sutton prior to the day of the accident?
A.
Yeh.
Q.
And how did you know E.J.?
A.
He was my boss on another job.
Q.
Okay. Prior to the Colonies project?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. And how were you related to E.J. during this particular project?
A.
The one on 174?
Q.
Uh-huh.
A.
He was my boss there.
(R.669).

Q

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

In your many years of working around construction, was this the first time that
you'd ever been asked to help some other trade or contractor that wasn't within
your specific prescribed assignment?
No.
You'd done that before?
Yes.
And others have testified that that happens from time to time on construction
projects that different trades will help each other out when there's a particular
need. Would you agree that that does happen?
Yes.
Okay. So this wasn't a shocking thing that occurred when Lowell
Construction asked if you guys could be of some help; isn't that true?
No.
It wasn't really a strange thing to occur?
No.
And, in fact, E.J. didn't order you to go and do it, did he? Isn't it true that he
asked you, he said, "Hey, Lowell Construction wants to know if you can come
and help them move this rebar."
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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And he said, "Will you do it?" Isn't that the gist of the conversation?
Yes.
So fair and square, it's not like E.J. said, "You have to do this or you're going
to get in trouble"? It was a request that had been made by Lowell
Construction; right?
Well, I don't know who requested it. E.J. asked me and I says, "No, I don't
want to, but I will." And that was the complete conversation.
Okay. So you can remember basically what you told E.J.; right"
Yes.
Okay. Help me with your great memory, what was it that E.J. said to you as
best you can recall?
"Will you come up and help them do this rebar?" And I says, "No, I don't
want to, but I will." And he says, "Okay." So he heads up the hill and I follow
him.
674.)
Okay, Do you recall this accident independently?
Yes.
Okay. I want you to start with, you were clearing the trees —
Yes.
Under E.J.'s supervision?
Yes.
I want you to just walk us through what happened step by step from the time
you were clearing the trees until the time changed and you were directed to go
another direction.
I was knocking the trees down and pulling them up, breaking them up, so we
can load them to haul it out. E.J. come to me and says, "Come up here. We
need to help these other guys."
I told him, "No, I don't want to do that, but I will."
Okay. Now, let's back up a little bit. You're knocking down the trees.
Right.
E.J. comes down and says, "Hey, I want you to come up and help me help
these guys"?
Yeah.
And why did you not want to?
Because I didn't think that's where I should be. I should have been down there
doing my job for Byer.
Okay. So you didn't think that helping somebody else was in the scope of your
employment ~
Yes.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- o n Lot 174?
(Witness nods head up and down.)
Okay. And so E.J. - did you have a discussion with E.J.? You said, "No, I
don't want to, but I will."
A
Yes.
Did you have some kind of discussion, "Hey, E.J., I don't want to do that, I
Q
don't think I should be doing that"?
Nope. That's all that was said.
A
Did you say I will out loud or were you ~
Q
Yes, I said I will.
A
Okay. Did E.J. say anything else to you?
Q
Not that I can remember. I just followed him up and ~
A
(R. 670.)

Q
A
Q

With respect to his use of the trackhoe, Miles testified as follows:
I want to talk a little bit about your experience with this Komatsu
Q
A.
Okay.
Q.
And that's the brand name correct?
A.
Yes, that's the make.
Q.
And it is a Komatsu 300, is that - do I have that right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. And is that the type of machine that you drive all of the time?
A.
Well, yeah, most of the time.
Q.
And is it usually the same machine or —
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Does Byer Excavating own that machine, do you know?
A.
Yes.
Q.
All right. And do you drive the machine?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are there other drivers at Byer that drive that same machine?
A.
Nope.
Q.
Okay. So it's kind of your baby?
A.
Yes.
Q.
You don't have to make the payment on it?
A.
Yes.
(R.669)
Q.
Okay. Let me back you up a little bit. And when you had hesitation about
helping, was your hesitation like, I shouldn't be doing that because that's not
my job? Or jeez, you're holding me up from doing my job or both?
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.
Q
A
Q
A

A
Q
A
Q
A
(R.

Well, it was I shouldn't be doing that because that's not what I'm paid to be
doing.
Did you call your boss and say No.
- "Hey, do you mind if I help?"
No.
Have you ever been instructed by anybody at Byer Excavating to call them and
run any problems by them, any concerns that you have on the site?
Nope.
So it's kind of your independent judgment as to whether or not you can make
that call?
Yes.
And you didn't feel that you should have to run that by anybody?
No.
670-671.)

According to the users manual, the trackhoe (excavator) involved in this accident was
designed to attach objects and lower them to the ground. (See R. 695.) Miles had previously
used the trackhoe/excavator to offload materials, specifically rebar. (See R. 668.) Miles also
stated that the offloading of rebar was "commonly done in the construction field" and
happens at a rate of 5%. (See id.) Moreover, Byer has regularly used its excavation
equipment to offload and lower materials on other projects. (See R. 689-690.)
Miles failed to notice Sutton or any other obstacles as he offloaded the rebar. (See R.
4 and 649.) The load fell onto Sutton, causing Sutton serious, life threatening and permanent
injuries. (See id.)
In a recorded statement Miles gave to an investigator in April of 2008, Miles says he
worked for Byer and he says nothing about the offloading of rebar being done on his own.
(See R. 662.)
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Doing favors for other contractors and subcontractors on sites, particularly when on
remote projects such as the one in this matter, is an industry standard barter system to create
good will and mutually benefit construction contractors. {See R. 674 and 667-680.) Byer
was benefitting on this very project through the gratuitous barter system common on
construction projects by having the use of Lot 173's port-a-potty for its employees who were
working on Lot 174. {See R. 677.) Moreover, Byer benefitted in this barter system by
Sutton's assistance in freeing Byer's own equipment delivery trailer that got stuck earlier that
day on the project. {See R. 684.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred by finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and
Byer was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. The record shows genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether Miles was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident. Specifically, an employer-employee relationship
existed because Byer had the right to control Miles. Miles was acting within the course and
scope of his employment at the time of the accident because (1) his conduct was of the
general kind he was employed to perform, (2) his conduct occurred within the hours of his
work and in the ordinary spatial boundaries of his employment, and (3) his conduct was
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving Byer's interest.
The record also shows that there are genuine issues ofmaterial fact regarding whether
Miles was operating under the apparent authority of Byer, making Byer vicariously liable for
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Miles' tortious conduct. Byer provided the trackhoe for Miles' exclusive use in his
employment for Byer. Byer had a history of allowing Miles to assist other contractors that
were not within Miles' specific prescribed assignment. Miles did not feel that he needed to
obtain any special permission from Byer to assist in offloading the rebar. By providing the
excavator and allowing Miles to use the excavator to assist in other projects without
obtaining specific permission, Byer provided apparent authority to Miles.
When the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Sutton, as they must be,
it is clear that there are genuine issues of material fact and the trial court erred in granting
Byer's motion for summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
'."I.

Summary Judgment Standard
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are "intended to encourage the adjudication of

disputes on their merits". Bonneville Tower Condominium Mgmt V. Thompson Michie
Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." "To make such a determination, [this Court] must consider
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Wilson v. Johnson, 234 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Utah Ct. App. 2010).
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The record evidence shows that there are genuine issues of material facts and
effectively controverts many of the material factual assertions by Byer. Specifically, there
are genuine issues to material facts that: (1) Byer employees have used Byer equipment to
do extra-contractual work on projects, and have used trackhoes to unload rebar; (2) Miles
was a Byer employee in control of Byer owned equipment at the time of the accident; (3)
Miles' conduct was motivated in part to benefit his employer Byer; and (4) Miles had the
apparent authority to operate the trackhoe in accomplishing the work that may have played
a role in the accident. The trial court erred when granting summary judgment, because, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Sutton, a reasonable mind could conclude that Miles
was working in the scope of his employment for Byer.
II.

Miles Was Acting Within the Scope of His Employment at the Time of the
Accident
In order for Sutton to hold Byer responsible for Miles' tortious conduct, Sutton must

show that (1) an employer-employee relationship existed between Miles and Byer and (2)
Miles was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See Glover
by & through Mary Dyson v. BSA, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996). It is undisputed that
Miles was an employee of Byer on the day of the accident. The question before the Court
is whether he was acting within the scope of his employment for Byer at the time of the
accident.
Summary judgment is proper on course and scope of employment only "when the
employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the scope of employment that reasonable
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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minds cannot differ." Newman v. White Water Whirlpool 197 P.3d 654, % 10 (Utah 2008).
In Newman the Utah Supreme Court articulated the standard for 'whether reasonable minds
cannot differ, which is if reasonable jurors, having been instructed by the trial court, would
be unable to come to any other conclusion regarding the employee's conduct, then summary
judgment is appropriate. See id. dX^W.
In determining whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of his
employment, the Utah Supreme Court developed a three-prong test in Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). First, an employee's conduct must be of the general
kind the employee is employed to perform. See id. at 1056-57. Second, the employee's
conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial
boundaries of the employment. See id. at 1057. Third, the employee's conduct must be
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. See id. Miles'
operation of the trackhoe to offload the rebar which played a role in the accident in this case
happened within Miles' course and scope of employment with Byer.
A.

First, an employee's conduct must be of the general kind the employee is
employed to perform.

In determining whether an employee's conduct was of the general kind the employee
is employed to perform, the Birkner Court stated:
[A]n employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed toward the
accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and
authority, or reasonably incidental thereto. In other words, the employee must
be about the employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer, as
opposed to being wholly involved in a personal endeavor.
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Id. at 1057.
Miles was performing the general kind of work that he was employed to perform.
Miles was a trackhoe operator for Byer, an excavation contractor. (See R. 668.) Miles was
doing excavation work on Lot 174 under the supervision of Sutton. During his work he was
asked by his supervisor to use the excavator to offload rebar, not an unusual request of him.
According to the users manual, the trackhoe (excavator) involved in this accident was
designed to attach objects and lower them to the ground. (See R. 695.) Miles had previously
used the trackhoe/excavator to offload materials, specifically rebar. (See R. 668.) Miles also
stated that the offloading of rebar was "commonly done in the construction field" and
happens at a rate of 5%. (See id.) Moreover, Byer has regularly used its excavation
equipment to offload and lower materials on other projects. (See R. 689-690.) Excavating
and offloading materials is of the general kind of work that Miles was employed to perform.
Miles assisting in offloading the rebar was generally directed toward the
accomplishment of objectives within the scope of his duties and authority or reasonably
incidental thereto. Miles was attending to Byer's business and the duties assigned to him
and not on a personal errand. Miles was asked by Sutton, an individual who had supervisory
authority over him, to help in offloading and he agreed to do it. (See R. 669-670.)
Doing favors for other contractors and subcontractors on job sites, particularly when
on remote projects such as the one in this matter, is an industry standard barter system to
create good will and mutually benefit construction contractors. (See R. 674 and 667-680.)
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Byer was benefitting on this very project through the gratuitous barter system common on
construction projects by the goodwill developed for Byer by having its employees assist in
other projects. An example of this beneficial cooperation and helping others was the
allowing of the use of Lot 173's port-a-potty by contractors who were working on Lot 174.
(See R. 674 and 677.) Moreover, Byer benefitted in this barter system by Sutton voluntarily
assisting in freeing a Byer trailer that had gotten stuck earlier that day on the project. (See
R. 684.) When construed in a light most favorable to Sutton, a juror could find that Miles
was engaged in the kind of work that he was employed to perform. Accordingly, the first
prong of the Birkner test is satisfied.
B.

Second, the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the
employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment.

Byer conceded that the accident happened within the regular hours of Miles5 work day
because the request interrupted Miles while performing excavation work on Lot 174. (See
R. 576.) Therefore the pertinent issue under this prong is whether or not the accident
occurred within the spatial boundaries of Miles' employment
An accident need not occur on the employer's premises or property to be considered
within the spatial boundaries of employment. In determining the spatial boundaries of
employment, no bright line test is applied rigidly to each situation and some flexibility is
required to apply the test to each situation. See Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 128
n.l (Utah 1994). In Swenson, the Utah Supreme Court found that reasonable minds could
differ as to whether Swenson was in the spatial boundaries even when she completely left
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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her jobsite for an unscheduled break to get some food. See /^ at 128.
In the present case, Miles never left Lot 174 to help offload the rebar when the
accident took place. (See R. 698-699.) The boom may have crossed over onto parts of Lot
173 but the trackhoe and Miles remained on Lot 174. (See id) This evidence combined with
the fact he was unloading the rebar at the behest of his supervisor on Lot 174 demonstrates
that Miles was operating within the spatial boundaries of his employment with Byer.
Miles contends in his affidavit that he did not submit time for the offloading work on
Lot 173. However, Miles also testified that he thought the offloading work would only take
5-10 minutes. Moreover, the first time that the non-submission of payment or non-payment
of Miles was raised was nearly three years after the accident. Again, in a recorded statement
Miles gave to an investigator in April of 2008, Miles said he worked for Byer and he said
nothing about the offloading of rebar being done on his own. (See R. 662.) The second
prong of the Birkner test is satisfied.
C.

Third, the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the
purpose of serving the employer's interest.

Under the third prong, the Court in Swenson held that reasonable minds could differ
on the question of whether Swenson5 s trip to a nearby restaurant to grab a quick meal was
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest. See Swenson,
at 129. In Swenson, the Court found that employees taking breaks gave the employers the
corresponding benefit of productive, satisfied employees. The Court found this exchange to
be significant enough to cause reasonable minds to differ as to whether the employer's
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interest was served. Furthermore, in Birkner the Court states that "if the employee acts 'from
purely personal motives . . . in no way connected with the employer's interests' or if the
conduct is 'unprovoked, highly unusual, and quite outrageous,'" the conduct should be
considered outside the scope of employment. Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1057 (quoting W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser andKeeton on the Law of Torts § 70, at 506 (5th ed. 1984)). Purely
personal motivation did not exist in this present case.
Miles' behavior was not self motivated. He was acting out of the interest of the
project and fellow subcontractors and contractors. Miles' only other objective interest would
be to make his own employer look like a team player creating goodwill for his employer with
the other contractors on the project. Reasonable minds may conclude that when Miles agreed
to assist with unloading the rebar he had his employer's interests in mind. Sutton, the
supervisor on Byer's job site, was asking for assistance. If he refused, it would reflect poorly
on Byer and could possibly have negative consequences. Miles was not motivated by his
own self interest. In fact, he testified that he did not personally want to help unload the rebar
{See R. 670.) Additionally, as stated above, the barter system was commonplace and it would
have reflected poorly on Byer for Miles to refuse assistance.
When the foregoing facts are construed in the light most favorable to Sutton, a juror
could find that Miles' actions in unloading the rebar were generally for the benefit of Byer.
Therefore, the third prong of the Birkner test is satisfied and the trial court erred in
determining that, as a matter of law, Miles was acting outside the scope of his employment.
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III.

Miles Operated Under the Apparent Authority of Byer, Making Byer
Vicariously Liable for Miles' Tortious Conduct
Utah courts have held that an employer may be vicariously liable for the acts of an

employee under a theory of apparent authority when the employer conducts itself in such a
way as to clothe its employee with apparent authority to perform the torts committed and
there is reasonable reliance on that apparent authority on the part of the injured party. See
Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995).
Sutton asked Miles to help with the offloading of the rebar while Miles was doing the
work designated for his employer Byer. {See R. 670.) Miles agreed to give assistance using
Byer's equipment. {See id.) Byer owned the trackhoe, and allowed Miles to operate it.
Miles did not believe he needed to contact any of his superiors at Byer to get permission to
do the work. (See R. 671.) Sutton presumed that if Miles needed authority from Byer, he
would have made the call. (See id.) Miles admitted that he has offloaded rebar on other
projects. (See R. 668.) Sutton has witnessed Byer employees on other projects offload and
otherwise move materials, including rebar, with their equipment. (See R. 689-690.) Sutton
helped Byer free a Byer trailer which had been stuck earlier in the day. (See R. 684.) The
two adjacent projects were sharing services (i.e., the sharing of the port-a-potty). (See R.
677.) Miles admitted that on construction projects, contractors help each other out with
favors. (See R. 674.) Byer provided Miles with the exclusive use of the trackhoe and gave
him authority regarding how to use it. (See R. 669-671.) Appellant submits that Miles had
the apparent authority to offload the rebar with the Byer trackhoe. Clearly at the very least,
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there is a question of fact regarding such and the trial court's grant of summary judgment was
m error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant E.J. Sutton requests a reversal of the Order on
Summary Judgment. When the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Appellant,
a reasonable mind could conclude that, (1) Miles was acting in the course and scope of his
employment for Byer at the time of the accident, and (2) Miles had apparent authority from
Byer at the time of the accident. When the facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to
Sutton, genuine issues of material fact exist and the trial court erred in granting Byer's
motion for summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _Y___ day of March, 2011

SCALLEY READING BATES
INSW & RAJSMUSSEN, p.C.

Edward Hansen
Jonathan H. Rupp
Attorneys for Appellant
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Stanford P. Fitts, #4834
Michael L. Ford, #8586
STRONG &HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Byer Excavating, Inc.
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801)323-2090

SALT L ..<e COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
E. J. SUTTON,
. Plaintiff,

ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
BYER EXCAVATING, INC., a Utah
. Corporation, LOWELL CONSTRUCTION
CO., a Utah Corporation, JAMES H.
- DIAMOND CONCRETE, a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 3,

iCivil No.:

080911879

Judge: Robert Hilder

Defendants.
The following motions came on regularly before the above entitled Court on My 21, •
2010 at 2:00 p.m., the Honorable Robert Hilder presiding:
1. Defendant Byer Excavating, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment
2. Plaintiff Sutton's Motion to Strike Portions of tfre Affidavit of Bob Miles.
3. Plaintiff Sutton's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Vic Byer.
4. Plaintiff Sutton's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Torrie S. Faavale.
=/.
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Defendant Byer Excavating, Inc. ("Byer Excavating") was represented by Stanford P. Fitts of
the law firm of Strong & Harini. Plaintiff E.J. Sutton ("Sutton'O was represented by John
Edward Hansen of the law firm of Scalley Reading Bates Hansen & Rasmnssen, P.C. Defendant
Lowell Constniction Co. was represented by Joanne M. Jorgensen of the law firm of Snow
Christensen & Martinean. Defendant Diamond Concrete was represented by Stephen F.
Edwards of the law firm of Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James.
The Court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, and
arguments of counsel and being folly advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS:
1.

Plaintiff Sutton's motions to strike are granted in part and denied in part The
Court will not consider legal conclusions in the Affidavit of Bob Miles. The Court
does not find that the Miles Affidavit directly contradicts the deposition testimony of
Bob Miles so as to warrant striking the subject portions of the Affidavit of Bob Miles.
The Court will not consider statements in the Faavale Affidavit regarding benefits to
Byer Excavating. The Court denies the motion to strike statements in the Byer'
Affidavit regarding alleged benefits to Byer Excavating. The Court denies the motion
to strike the factual statements in the Faavale and Byer affidavits regarding the hours
worked by Bob Miles. The Court, however, will not consider conclusions in the
affidavits as to the legal impact of those facts.

2.

The Court hereby grants Byer Excavating's Motion for Summary Judgment on
the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and Byer Excavating is

2
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entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law that Bo.b Miles was acting outside
the course and scope of his employment for Byer Excavating at the time of the
accident which is the subject of this action and Byer Excavating is not liable for the
• conduct alleged in the Complaint
3.

Byer Excavating is awarded its costs incurred in this matter in the amount of
$1,392.10 as set forth in the Affidavit of Stanford P. Fittsfiled'withthe Court

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of Byer Excavating, Inc. and against Plaintiff
EJ. Sutton dismissing with prejudice all claims of Plaintiff E. J. Sutton against Byer Excavating,
Inc. in this matter and for costs to be paid by Plaintiff EJ. Sutton to Byer'Excavating, Inc. in the
amount of $1,392.10, together with post judgment interest at the rate of 2.41% per annum and
costs and attorneys fees incurred in collection of the Judgment
DATED tbiSc^V

day of September, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

%N^.-o<v^
JudgefcobertHilder\J^^°Z
Third Judicial District C o u i t X S j ^

Approved as to Form
SCALLEY READING BATES HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C.

|dwafd Hansen
Attbifcteys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the If

day of September, 2010, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document was served by the method indicated below to the following:
John Edward Hansen

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email
ECF Notification

SCALLEY READING BATES HANSEN &
RASMUSSEN

15 West South Temple, Suite 600
P.O. Box 11429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0429
Joseph E. Minnock
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES LLC

)
( )
( )
( )

136 South Main Street, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

C)
Julianne P. Blanch
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

X
(
(
(
(

10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
-P;0rBrar4-5-0ee
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Email
ECF Notification

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
""} Hand Delivered
) Overnight Mail
) Facsimile
) Email
) /ECF Notification
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